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short at a dozen corpses because they had no ideology.1 
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 1. ALEXANDR L. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO: 1918-56, at 173-74 (Tho-
mas P. Whitney trans., 1973). 
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 The Nazis used a legal system to commit genocide; the Khmer 
Rouge did not. What may seem an insignificant statement, consider-
ing the horror of the end results has often overshadowed any focus on 
methodology, in fact holds the key to a better understanding of hu-
manity’s greatest evil. Exploring both the fact of this difference as 
well as the reasons for its existence presents a focus on the roots as 
well as the branches, maximizing comprehension of the greater prob-
lem of genocide. Analysis reveals the differences were based on dis-
parity in ideology as well as diversity of enemy, and the striking 
similarity of the horror caused despite such differences. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
  In any analysis, two questions arise. First, why is this undertak-
ing of interest? The novel comparison of two very different perpetra-
tors of genocide is necessary to help the world to realize the poorly 
understood how of humanity’s greatest evil as opposed to the more 
fully explored ethical why. Second, how is it helpful? In showing how 
regimes borne of opposite ideologies and targeting different enemies, 
yet united by genocidal pursuits, can lead to the same dreadful re-
sults, it shall aid human rights advocates in the early recognition of 
genocide and in arguing that political groups should be included in 
its definition.  
 When considering human atrocity, many wish to dismiss its per-
petrators as inhuman rather than face the possibility that something 
entirely human led to such horror.2 Indeed, some may object to the 
exploration of the methods employed by architects of genocide as giv-
ing them a human face, rather choosing to dismiss them as monsters. 
Such dismissal is dreadful, for to give meaning to the words “never 
again” we must uphold our duty to break the causal chain as early as 
possible. To do so we must employ knowledge and action in the face 
of banality. 
 Part II sets out and defines the terms and concepts of this analy-
sis, explaining why the Nazis and Khmer Rouge are used, as well as 
giving special treatment to the definition of genocide (detailed ex-
                                                                                                                      
 2. In fact, perhaps the most shocking feature of the Holocaust and other atrocities 
was the critical role played by entirely human traits. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN 
JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (rev. & enlarged ed., Penguin Books 
1983) (describing the role bureaucracy played in the Holocaust); SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 
1, at 168: 
 If only it were so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously 
committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest 
of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart 
of every human being. 
 . . . . 
 . . . it is after all only because of the way things worked out that they were the 
executioners and we weren’t. 
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amination is required due to inherent difficulties in defining the 
term). Part III briefly describes the Nazi regime and provides a syn-
opsis of the major legal documents used in committing legal genocide 
against the Jews. Part IV briefly describes the Khmer Rouge regime 
and provides a synopsis of the major political documents shedding 
light on its ideology of committing extra-legal genocide against ene-
mies of the state. Part V explains why the Nazis used a legal system 
and the Khmer Rouge used extra-legal means to commit genocide 
and what can be learned from this difference in light of the similar 
results. Finally, Part VI concludes the analysis.  
II.   TUNING THE PIANO3 
 The first step to any argument is also the most essential: the defi-
nition of terms. What follows is a synopsis of the contextual meaning 
of this exercise’s critical terms and concepts.  
A.   The Players: The German Nazis and Cambodian Khmer Rouge 
 One has many regimes to choose from in constructing a compara-
tive analysis of perpetrators of genocide—above all, the Nazis and 
Khmer Rouge stand out. Their differences are striking, yet their 
qualities may be reduced to where the two appear almost identical. 
Employing ideologies reaching opposite ends of the political spec-
trum, each regime delivered a most sinister dictator: the Nazis were 
ruled by the iron fist of Ein Führer4 (Adolf Hitler), the Khmer Rouge 
by the shrouded talon of Brother Number One (Pol Pot).5   
                                                                                                                      
 3. See JOHN BARTH, THE FLOATING OPERA 7-14 (1956). In other words, setting out 
and defining the terms of analysis.  
 4. One Leader. 
 5. The ideological contradiction of using a communist revolution to replace a dictator 
with another dictator, as displayed by modern communist revolutions (which have almost 
always stopped short of reaching Marx’s final step and, instead, have converted into fascist 
dictatorships) and the resulting betrayal of the people in whose name the revolutions were 
conducted, is a testament to the corrupting quality of power and has been documented in 
literature as well as scholarship. Despite stated political means representing the polar op-
posite of fascism, the leaders such revolutions have produced are hard to distinguish from 
the rulers they ousted. See, e.g., GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 139 (Signet Classic 1996) 
(1946) (“The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig 
to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was which.”); Vladimir Pozner, 
Introduction to KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO vii, xiv-xv 
(Bantam Books 1992) (1888): 
 What certainly did occur in the U.S.S.R. was the abolishing of private prop-
erty. The same happened in Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the 
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the People’s Republic of Korea, Poland, 
Romania, Vietnam. But in none of them was public, collective property instituted. 
What replaced private ownership was state ownership. All the means of produc-
tion were both de jure and de facto owned, controlled, and run by the state. 
That fundamental and irreversible fact is what allows me to say unequivocally 
that neither socialism nor its supreme state of development, communism, ever 
existed in the Soviet Union or in any of the other so-called Communist countries. 
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 The Nazis were a fascist group elected and appointed to power in 
an industrialized Western European nation; the Khmer Rouge con-
ducted a communist revolution within their agrarian Southeast 
Asian state. The Nazis sought purity of blood by reinventing man-
kind, targeting the contaminators (Jews) with a system of racist laws 
that escalated into mass extermination; the Khmer Rouge sought pu-
rity of society by reinventing civilization, slowly killing their citi-
zenry first as components through forced labor and relocation and ul-
timately as political enemies through torture and execution. Both 
sought a better way of life through the elimination of enemies, were 
fueled by intense hatred,6 and have shown the world just how de-
structive such motivation can become: the Nazis have set the stan-
dard for the modern definition of evil,7 and the Khmer Rouge mur-
dered more than one quarter of their own population.8 
B.   A Single Word, Eternal Dread: Genocide 
 Whereas the concept of genocide is ancient, the roots of the word 
itself do not run deep. This is important to remember in trying to de-
fine genocide, permitting the meaning to be shaped as we better un-
derstand the underlying concept rather than holding the Geneva 
Convention’s definition as a stone decree against which all things 
shall be measured. 
1.   Lemkin’s Quest 
 Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish lawyer who fled Poland shortly after 
                                                                                                                      
Cf. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 268 (William P. Baumgarth 
& Richard J. Regan eds., Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1988) (“[I]t 
regularly happens in the case of tyranny that a latter tyrant is more oppressive than his 
predecessor, for he does not give up the preceding oppression but rather thinks up new 
forms out of the malice of his heart.”); “Power is delightful and absolute power is absolutely 
delightful.” Kenneth Tynan (UK Theatre Critic), What is Politics? Some Famous Quotes: at 
http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/politics/politicsquotes.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2003) (on 
file with author). 
 6. A defining point for both is their extreme hatred for their respective enemies. Al-
though it may be argued that love for their blood and society was primary and hatred of 
the “threat” thus secondary, the obsession with and overwhelming focus on elimination of 
the enemy and the almost illusory quality of their “blood” and “society” suggests just the 
opposite. Hatred has often been noted as the preferred motivation of oppressive regimes, 
leaving one to wonder about the result had love—for nation, for your people, for anything—
taken its place. See, e.g., CHE GUEVARA, Message to the Tricontinental, in GUERRILLA WAR-
FARE 160, 173 (Bison Books 1998) (1961): 
 Hatred as an element of the struggle; a relentless hatred of the enemy, impel-
ling us over and beyond the natural limitations that man is heir to and trans-
forming him into an effective, violent, selective and cold killing machine. Our sol-
diers must be thus; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy.  
 7. See JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 317 (1999). 
 8. Id. at 309. 
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the German invasion in 1939, dedicated his life to lobbying for con-
crete action against the state-sanctioned mass murder of ethnic and 
religious minorities.9 Lemkin’s anti-Nazi activism culminated in the 
publication of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, a collection of Nazi laws 
imposed on the occupied territories10 with which he sought to silence 
the critics that accused him of blowing Nazi activity out of propor-
tion.11 
 Inspired by a speech made by Winston Churchill addressing the 
Nazi activity as a “crime without a name,”12 Lemkin decided to give it 
one.13 Perhaps Axis Rule’s greatest contribution was the world’s first 
definition of genocide: 
 New conceptions require new terms. By “genocide” we mean the 
destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. This new word, 
coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern devel-
opment, is made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) 
and the Latin cide (killing), thus corresponding in its formation to 
such words as tyrannicide, homocide [sic], infanticide, etc. . . . 
Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and 
the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their 
individual capacity, but as members of the national group.14 
 The end of World War II brought the Nuremberg Trial, in which 
the Allies tried Nazi war criminals for their actions against the Jews 
and other groups.15 Despite the success of the tribunal in punishing 
the defendants in front of it, Lemkin was troubled: although his new 
word had been mentioned in the proceedings, genocide had been left 
off the list of crimes for which the defendants had been convicted.16 
In addition, the tribunal continued to show deference to the concept 
of sovereignty, trying the defendants only for crimes committed after 
the Nazis had “crossed an internationally recognized border.”17 Lem-
kin realized the resulting limits of any deterrent effect as it left open 
the possibility that had “the Nazis . . . exterminated the entire Ger-
man Jewish population but never invaded Poland, they would not 
                                                                                                                      
 9. SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE 17-60 (2002).  
 10. Id. at 38-39. 
 11. Id. 
 12. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 3 THE CHURCHILL WAR PAPERS: THE EVER-WIDENING 
WAR 1102 (Martin Gilbert ed., 2000). 
 13. POWER, supra note 9, at 29.  
 14. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944); see also id. at 82-90 
(describing the types of genocide as political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, 
religious, and moral). 
 15. POWER, supra note 9, at 49-50. 
 16. Id. at 50 (listing crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
but leaving out genocide). 
 17. Id. at 49. 
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have been liable at Nuremberg.”18 Future regimes would thus theo-
retically be permitted to commit genocide as long as it was within 
their own borders. Recognizing that coining the term was not suffi-
cient to end genocide, Lemkin sought out the newly formed United 
Nations to make a genocide ban part of binding international law.19  
 Lemkin’s quest culminated with the United Nations’ adoption of 
the Genocide Convention,20 marking the first time the United Na-
tions had adopted a human rights treaty.21 Article 2 of the Genocide 
Convention defines genocide as: 
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as 
such: 
 (a) Killing members of the group; 
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.22 
Although the failure of statesmen to invoke it to punish perpetrators 
of genocide has been sharply criticized,23 the Genocide Convention 
has provided the world with a legal definition observed as the mod-
ern standard.24 However convenient, this legal definition should not 
mark the end of critical analysis involved in capturing such an im-
portant concept in words. 
2.   Room for One More: Political Groups 
 Although the final version of the Genocide Convention lists only 
national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups as protected classes, 
                                                                                                                      
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 50.  
 20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
 21. POWER, supra note 9, at 60. 
 22. Genocide Convention, supra note 20, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S at 280 (emphasis added).  
 23. See, e.g., GLOVER, supra note 7, at 122 (discussing the instructions given to the 
Clinton Administration’s State Department not to use the word “genocide” in describing 
the situation in Rwanda in the 1990s to avoid triggering the Genocide Convention’s legal 
obligation to take action, and how the UN Security Council followed suit). The focus here is 
on the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide rather than on its broader practical 
failures.  
 24. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 6, 
37 I.L.M. 999, 1004 (setting forth the International Criminal Court’s definition of genocide, 
which is identical to that of the Genocide Convention). 
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earlier versions included political groups.25 The use of the Nazi geno-
cide and its targeting of ethnic and racial groups as a backdrop for 
the drafters may have led to the later omission of political groups—a 
more probable explanation is that drafting nations (such as Stalin’s 
Russia) engaged in deliberate destruction of political groups and did 
not wish to be charged with genocide.26  
 Time has exposed the dreadful mistake caused by the omission of 
political groups from protected classes. The case of the Khmer Rouge 
genocide has proven difficult—although they attacked Buddhists and 
ethnic Vietnamese, their main target was what they considered ene-
mies of the state.27 Despite the focused extermination of political 
groups and the resulting conflict with the Genocide Convention’s 
definition, the actions of the Khmer Rouge are generally called geno-
cide as their killing fields conjure images of Nazi death camps. Ac-
cording to the Genocide Convention’s definition, the Khmer Rouge 
could only be tried for the killing of ethnic and religious minorities 
and would see no punishment for the mass extermination of their 
true targets, creating a situation almost as odd as the Nuremberg 
tribunal’s implied acceptance of a theoretical Nazi Germany that 
murdered all the Jews within its borders without invading Poland. 
Both situations have arisen out of good intentions; indeed, more is of-
ten required.  
 Although coinage of the term genocide was an important step in 
setting the stage to rid the world of it, danger arises when the word 
is used not as a beam of light to expose horror but as a blinder to 
prevent action—the world must focus on pulling perpetrators of 
genocide out of power, not on pulling the wool over its collective eye. 
“Language is like a finger that points out the truth, but most people 
see only the finger, instead of looking deep into the direction the fin-
ger is pointing.”28 For the purposes of this exercise, the definition of 
genocide includes political groups as a protected class—answering 
                                                                                                                      
 25. Diane F. Orentlicher, Genocide, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD 
KNOW 153, 154 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999).  
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra Part IV.  
 28. TSAI CHIH CHUNG, THE TAO SPEAKS: LAO-TZU’S WHISPERS OF WISDOM 100 (Brian 
Bruya trans., 1995). 
A Buddhist nun named Wujincang said to the Sixth Zen Patriarch, Hui Neng: 
 “I’d like you to explain a passage in the Nirvana Sutra for me.” 
 “I’m sorry, but I can’t read. You go ahead and read it to me, and then I will ex-
plain it.” 
 “If you can’t even read the words, how can you understand the principles be-
hind them?” 
 “The truth is independent of language, language is like my finger; I can point 
out the moon with it, but it is not the moon. And you don’t need to point at the 
moon to see it.” 
Id. 
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the victims’ call to look beyond the finger (the Genocide Convention’s 
definition). 
C.   Turning Principles into Action: The Legal System 
 A legal system is an integral part of any government as it provides 
the ability to apply a given political framework to the citizenry and 
put principles into action. Although important, legal systems do not 
necessarily pervade every aspect of a particular regime’s agenda—
some things are left to extra-legal means. The Nazi goal was to 
eliminate the Jews, and they initialized their assault through a 
framework of specific laws, while the Khmer Rouge violence began as 
a consequence of their social goal and boiled into an anti-enemy fer-
vor rivaling that of the Nazis. 
III.   EIN FÜHRER: HITLER’S NAZI GERMANY 
 Nazi ideology materialized from the combination of three factors: 
post-World War I anti-Semitism (emotion), Social Darwinist racial 
theory (science), and Nietzschean belief (reason).29 The Nazis put 
forth great effort through science and philosophy towards satisfying 
the apparent urge to legitimize their treatment of the Jews.  
 Germany’s rough terrain had given way to little visitation from 
outsiders in the ancient world, giving Germans a unique racial 
unity30 and a special sense of pride in their blood and soil. This view 
has been recorded as early as 98 AD31 and explains the depth of hu-
miliation felt by the proud nation upon losing World War I and hav-
ing the harsh terms of the Armistice imposed upon her by the victors. 
Humiliation often leads to anger and the search for a scapegoat upon 
which to focus it—Adolf Hitler focused his anger on the Jews and ex-
pressed it as part of his master plan in Mein Kampf,32 which was to 
become the blueprint of the Third Reich. 
 Not only were the Jews to blame for the World War I defeat, to the 
Nazis they were of inferior design. Social Darwinism combined with 
Mendelian genetics to create a scientific basis for the “Racial Hy-
giene” movement in Germany.33 Racial Hygiene, developed as a 
means of “improving and protecting the gene pool of the [Aryan] 
race,”34 bolstered racial hatred with “scientific” validation.  
                                                                                                                      
 29. GLOVER, supra note 7, at 317. 
 30. Id. at 319. 
 31. See CORNELIUS TACITUS, Germania, in TACITUS ON BRITAIN AND GERMANY 101 (H. 
Mattingly trans., 1948). 
 32. See ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (Ralph Manheim trans., Houghton Mifflin 1999) 
(1925) (“My Struggle”).  
 33.  GLOVER, supra note 7, at 321.  
 34. Id. 
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 Finally, Nietzsche’s emphasis on the triumph of the will over emo-
tion gave the Nazis the mental strength to accomplish the horrors of 
the Holocaust.35 The choice of self-definition through hardness was 
seen as central to the establishment and assertion of a new national 
identity, and such emphasis led to a devaluation of human compas-
sion and other emotions.36  
 With a set ideology of hatred founded upon angry anti-Semitism, a 
belief in “scientific” racial superiority, and a will immune from emo-
tional influence, the Nazis embarked on a catastrophic mission tar-
geting a clearly defined enemy. After taking control of the govern-
ment, they quickly built a wall of legal repression around the Jews, 
which culminated in the Nuremberg Laws and Kristallnacht decrees 
and left the Jews vulnerable to the violence that lay ahead.37  
A.   Rise: In the Name of National Security 
 Rising on the shoulders of a government seeking a leader to offset 
the Communist Party’s advances and a citizenry longing for a new 
national identity, Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933.38 
Having already laid his plans for a legal takeover, it is puzzling how 
he was able to take the inaugural oath with a straight face: 
I will employ my strength for the welfare of the German people, 
protect the Constitution and laws of the German people, conscien-
tiously discharge the duties imposed on me and conduct my affairs 
of office impartially and with justice to everyone.39  
 The burning of the Reichstag40 provided Hitler with his opportu-
nity to initiate his attack on the German Constitution: in characteriz-
ing the blaze as a heinous act of Communist arson,41 he convinced the 
President to protect the nation from Communist violence through the 
issue of decrees suspending the constitutional right of “personal lib-
erty, the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the 
press[,] and the rights of assembly and association.”42 Freedoms of 
“speech, . . . freedom from invasion of privacy[,] . . . and from house 
search without warrant” were also eliminated.43  
                                                                                                                      
 35. See id. at 325-26.  
 36. See id. 
 37. See Peter Pulzer, Antisemitism, in THE HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA 16, 25 (Walter 
Laqueur & Judith Tydor Baumel eds., 2001).  
 38. See YEHUDA BAUER & NILI KEREN, A HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST 87-88 (1982).  
 39. LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS: 1933-1945, at 48 (1975). 
 40. The German Legislature.  
 41. BAUER & KEREN, supra note 38, at 93-94. The true identity of the fire’s source, 
whether the Communist Party, the deranged Dutch Communist found at the scene acting 
alone, or even the Nazi party in an attempt to provide the needed act of terror of which to 
accuse the communist party, remains a mystery. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 39, at 50.  
 42. BAUER & KEREN, supra note 38, at 94. 
 43. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 39, at 50. 
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 In the name of national security, Hitler pushed the Enabling Act 
through the Reichstag. No ordinary piece of legislation, the Enabling 
Act removed the power of legislation from the Reichstag and gave it 
to the Nazi-controlled government, thus giving Hitler legal dictato-
rial powers.44 Hitler’s plan had come full circle, stemming entirely 
from a mysterious fire and feeding on national fear of the enemy—
concealing his true motives under the banner of national security, 
Hitler managed to use the system to destroy itself.  
B.   Building the Wall 
 The Nazis immediately proceeded to codify earlier anti-Semitic 
proposals, drawing heavily from Heinrich Class’s book, If I Were the 
Kaiser:45  
 All public offices, whether national, state, or municipal, salaried 
or honorary, are closed to Jews. 
 Jews are not admitted to serve in the army or navy. 
 Jews have neither an active nor a passive right to vote. The oc-
cupation of lawyer and teacher is forbidden to them, also the direc-
tion of theaters. 
 Newspapers on which Jews work must make that known; news-
papers that may be called “German” are not permitted to be owned 
by Jews or to have Jewish managers or coworkers. 
 Banks that are not purely personal enterprises are not permit-
ted to have any Jewish directors.  
 In the future rural property may not be owned by Jews or mort-
gaged by them. 
 As compensation for the protection that Jews enjoy as aliens, 
they must pay double the taxes that Germans pay.46  
The “Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service” effec-
tively barred Jews from government employ and was later extended 
to university professors.47 Later decrees imposed a 1.5% cap on new 
admissions of Jews to universities until the total number of non-
Aryan students fell to 5% of the total student body,48 established a 
Reich Chamber of Culture which “saw to the exclusion of Jews from 
cultural and entertainment enterprises,”49 excluded Jews from the 
press (the National Press Law),50 banned the shehitah, 51 and prohib-
                                                                                                                      
 44. Id. at 51.  
 45. DANIEL FRYMANN, WENN ICH DER KAISER WÄR’—POLITISCHE WAHRHEITEN UND 
NOTWENDIGKITEN (1912) (Heinrich Class writing under the pseudonym Daniel Frymann).  
 46. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 39, at 57 (quoting FRYMANN, supra note 45, at 76). 
 47. Id. at 58-59.  
 48. Id. at 59.  
 49. Id. 
 50. BAUER & KEREN, supra note 38, at 100-01. 
 51. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 39, at 60 (ritual Jewish slaughter of animals for food). 
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ited Jews from inheriting farm property.52 In addition, “the Law on 
the Revocation of Naturalization and Annulment of German Citizen-
ship deprived Jewish immigrants . . . of German citizenship.”53  
 The legal assault did not end with the living54—the development 
of Nazi Racial Hygiene led to the promulgation of a law requiring 
sterilization of those with “‘congenital mental defect, schizophrenia, 
manic-depressive psychosis, hereditary epilepsy, hereditary chorea, 
hereditary blindness, hereditary deafness, severe physical deformity, 
and severe alcoholism.’”55 This mindset and subsequent codification 
led to euthanasia programs for the “incurably sick”56 and the sterili-
zation of Jews.57 
C.   The Nuremberg Laws 
 Brick by brick, the Nazis built a wall of disenfranchisement 
around the Jews that isolated them from all aspects of German soci-
ety. What had previously been left to anti-Semitic fantasy had be-
come legally-sanctioned reality. As the wall grew in height and 
thickness, it became easier for the Nazis to add to it.  
 The birth of the Nuremberg Laws would close the gaps left by the 
patchwork decrees and consolidate the legal anti-Semitic movement. 
Whereas earlier decrees isolated the Jewish community from Ger-
man society in degrees, the Nuremberg Laws finalized perhaps the 
greatest blow the Nazis could deliver at the time: 58 officially defining 
Jews as non-citizens and banning marital relations between Jews 
and Germans. Despite their confidence and bureaucratic talents, the 
Nazis ran into a common legislative predicament: the problem of 
providing statutory definitions for vague yet widely-held conceptions 
(how to define a Jew, in their case). 
                                                                                                                      
 52. Id. at 60-61.  
 53. BAUER & KEREN, supra note 38, at 101. 
 54. “Only when the State and the public-health authorities will strive to make the 
core of their responsibilities the provision for the yet unborn, then we can speak of a new 
era and of a reconstructed population and race policy.” DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 39, at 65 
(quoting the address of Wilhelm Frick, the architect of the Nuremberg Laws, to the first 
meeting of the Council of Experts on Population and Race Policy, June 28, 1933).  
 55. GLOVER, supra note 7, at 322; see also DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 39, at 65 (describ-
ing the use of “Hereditary Health Courts” to order forced sterilizations).  
 56. BAUER & KEREN, supra note 38, at 208. 
 57. Ronit Fisher, Medical Experimentation, in THE HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra 
note 37, at 410, 411-12. 
 58. “After the enactment of the Nuremberg Laws, Jews were no longer allowed to call 
themselves Germans. The Jewish organizations had to change their names so that they 
spoke for ‘Jews in Germany’ rather than ‘German Jews.’” DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 39, at 
193.  
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1.   Drawing Lines  
 The Nuremberg Laws consist of three decrees seeking to effec-
tively isolate Jews from German society and to prevent the further 
mixing of races.  
 The first decree (“The Reich Citizenship Law”) defined a Reich 
citizen:  
Article 1 
 1) A subject of the State is a person, who belongs to the protec-
tive union of the German Reich, and who, therefore, has particular 
obligations towards the Reich. 
 2) The status of the subject is acquired in accordance with the 
provisions of the Reich- and State Law of Citizenship. 
Article 2 
 1) A citizen of the Reich is only that subject, who is of German or 
kindred blood and who, through his conduct, shows that he is both 
desirious [sic] and fit to serve faithfully the German people and 
Reich. 
 2) The right to citizenship is acquired by the granting of Reich 
citizenship papers. 
 3) Only the citizen of the Reich enjoys full political rights in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Laws. 
Article 3 
 The Reich Minister of the Interior in conjunction with the Dep-
uty of the Fuhrer will issue the necessary legal and administrative 
decrees for the carrying out and supplementing of this law.59 
The text of the law on its face seems innocent enough. Upon closer 
examination, the Article 2 language referring to blood as defining 
citizenship, the conditioning of citizenship on the grant of certain pa-
pers by the government, and the exclusionary statement that only 
citizens are entitled to full legal rights laid the foundation for total 
Jewish disenfranchisement. Anyone defined out of the “German or 
kindred blood” category could be refused papers and thus stripped of 
any legal protection.  
 The second decree (“Law for the Protection of German Blood and 
German Honor”) banned the mixing of races as well as showings of 
German national pride by Jews: 
 Thoroughly convinced by the knowledge that the purity of Ger-
man blood is essential for the further existence of the German 
people and inturned by the inflexible will to safe-guard the Ger-
man nation for the entire future. The Reichs Parliament (Reich-
stag) has resolved upon the following law unanimously which is 
promulgated herewith: 
                                                                                                                      
 59. Reichsbuergergesetz [The Reich Citizenship Law], v. 15.9.1935 (RGB1. I S.1146), 
reprinted in 1 THE HOLOCAUST: SELECTED DOCUMENTS IN EIGHTEEN VOLUMES 23 (John 
Mendelsohn ed., 1982) (presenting translation by Fred Niepergall (Sept. 27, 1945)) (em-
phasis added) [hereinafter THE HOLOCAUST].  
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Section 1 
 1. Marriages between Jews and nationals of German or kindred 
blood are forbidden. Marriages concluded in defiance of this law 
are void, even if, for the purpose of evading this law, they are con-
cluded abroad.  
 2. Proceedings for annulment may be initiated only by the Public 
Prosecutor. 
Section 2 
 Relations outside marriage between Jews and nationals of Ger-
man or kindred blood are forbidden. 
Section 3 
 Jews will not be permitted to employ female nationals of Ger-
man or kindred blood [under forty-five years old] in their house-
holds. 
Section 4 
 1. Jews are forbidden to hoist the Reichs and national flag and to 
present the colors of the Reich. 
 2. On the other hand they are permitted to present the Jewish 
colors. The exercise of this authority is protected by the State. 
Section 5 
 1. Who acts contrary to the prohibition of section 1 will be pun-
ished with hard labor. 
 2. The man who acts contrary to the prohibition of section 2 will 
be punished with imprisonment or with hard labor. 
 3. Who acts contrary to the provisions of sections 3 or 4 will be 
punished with imprisonment up to a year and with a fine or with 
one of these penalties.60 
Through the extension of restrictions from public to private life based 
on the knowledge of racial superiority, this law provided the legal 
means to prevent further mixing of the races. In a somewhat odd 
twist, while taking away the rights of Jews to display acts of German 
pride it granted to them a legal protection: the right to showings of 
Jewish pride. What may appear to be legal aid was in fact a tactic of 
further disenfranchisement, encouraging the Jews to isolate them-
selves.  
 The third decree, a clarifying regulation promulgated under Sec-
tion 3 of The Reich Citizenship Law, showed true Nazi colors in mak-
ing it impossible for Jews to be citizens: 
Article 2 
 . . . . 
                                                                                                                      
 60. Gesetz zum Schutze des Deutschen Blutes und der Deutschen Ehre [Law for the 
Protection of German Blood and German Honor], v. 15.9.1935 (RGB1. I S.100), reprinted in 
1 THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 59, at 24 (presenting translation by T.W. Schonfeld (Nov. 17, 
1945)) (emphasis added). This particular translation omits the section 3 “under forty-five 
years old” language commonly found in other translations. See, e.g., LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ, 
A HOLOCAUST READER 48 (1976). 
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 (2) An individual of mixed Jewish blood [Mischling], is one who 
descended from one or two grandparents who were racially full 
Jews, insofar as does not count as a Jew according to Article 5, 
paragraph 2. One grandparent shall be considered as full-blooded 
Jew if he or she belonged to the Jewish religious community. 
Article 3 
 Only the Reich citizen, as bearer of full political rights, exercises 
the right to vote in political affairs, and can hold a public office. . . .  
Article 4 
 (1) A Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He has no right to vote 
in political affairs, he cannot occupy a public office.  
 . . . .  
Article 5 
 (1) A Jew is anyone who descended from at least three grandpar-
ents who were racially full Jews. Article 2, par. 2, second sentence 
will apply. 
 (2) A Jew is also one who descended from two full Jewish par-
ents, if: 
 (a) he belonged to the Jewish religious community at the time 
this law was issued, or who joined the community later. 
(b) he was married to a Jewish person, at the time the law was 
issued, or married one subsequently. 
 (c) he is the offspring from a marriage with a Jew . . . which was 
contracted after the Law for the protection of German blood and 
German honor became effective . . . . 
 (d) he is the offspring of an extramarital relationship, with a 
Jew, . . . and will be born out of wedlock after July 31, 1936.61 
The Reich Citizenship Law’s gaps were thus filled as the Nazis clari-
fied the goal of denying Jews citizenship status and, thus, legal pro-
tection. Although intended to clarify, the regulation exposed a major 
problem—definitions. 
2.   Defining Mischlinge 
 What seemed obvious to the Nazi lawmakers in discussion and 
propaganda had become a problem that grew only more evasive as 
more work was put into it: how to define a Jew? As in any law, the 
problem lay not in the black and white (full-blooded Aryans vs. full-
blooded Jews) but in the gray (Mischlinge—those of mixed blood). 
The distinction was significant as section 2(2) of the Regulation de-
fined Mischlinge as non-Jews and thus permitted them to become 
                                                                                                                      
 61. Erste Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz [First Regulation to the Reichs Citi-
zenship Law], v. 14.11.1935 (RGB1. I S.1333), reprinted in 1 THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 
59, at 31-32 (presenting translation by Fred Niebergall (Sept. 28, 1945)) (emphasis added). 
A copy of the original document may be found at, 1 THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 59, at 27-
30. This particular translation omits the article 2(2) “Mischling” term commonly found in 
other translations (the plural is “Mischlinge”). See, e.g., DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 60, at 46.  
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citizens of the Reich and avoid the full Nazi intent of the Nuremberg 
Laws. 
 The Nazis settled on classifying “[p]ersons with two Jewish 
grandparents . . . as half-Jews or Mischlinge of the first degree, and 
those with one Jewish grandparent . . . as quarter-Jews or 
Mischlinge of the second degree.”62 To avoid confusion, the govern-
ment produced special flow charts to help determine race.63 Where 
proper genealogical records were unavailable, physical examinations 
were conducted to determine a given person’s racial traits.64 Both de-
grees of Mischlinge were eligible for Reich citizenship under the 
Regulation, although the government reserved discretionary cancel-
lation authority.65 Despite the efforts at definition and focus on pu-
rity of blood, religious affiliation remained a defining factor (an obvi-
ous contradiction in terms): Mischlinge of the first degree that were 
members of the Jewish religious community as well as Christian 
converts to Judaism were defined as full Jews.66 
D.   The Kristallnacht67 Decrees 
 Just as the Reichstag fire provided Hitler with the opportunity to 
begin his legal quest for dictatorship, the assassination of a German 
diplomat in Paris by a Jewish student gave rise to the opportunity 
for a major assault on the Jewish community in Germany. Although 
Hitler never publicly commented on the assassination, he was over-
heard stating, “the SA [the Nazi party’s uniformed division] should 
be allowed to have a fling.”68 The resulting “fling” was Kristallnacht, 
a pogrom of unprecedented proportion reaching every corner of the 
Reich, leading to the mass destruction of Jewish property.69   
 Whereas the Nazis had increased legal repression of the Jews by 
degrees up to this point, the absurdity of the decrees following 
Kristallnacht reflect how much the Nazi legal assault had developed. 
Not only had the Nazis destroyed Jewish property, they made them 
                                                                                                                      
 62. Annegret Ehmann, Mischlinge, in THE HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 37, 
at 420, 422-23.  
 63. Id. at 421 (presenting a copy of one such flow chart).  
 64. Id. at 423; see also id. at 422 (displaying a picture of a young man having the di-
mensions of his skull measured).  
 65. Id. at 423.  
 66. Id. 
 67. “Crystal Night,” referring to the amount of broken glass lying in the streets the 
following morning. See Karol Jonca, Kristallnacht, in THE HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, su-
pra note 37, at 385.  
 68. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 39, at 101. 
 69. Jonca, supra note 67, at 388-89.  
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legally responsible for the costs of repair (part of the “cold joke”70 
Nazi mentality):  
Section 1. 
 All damages which were caused to Jewish business houses and 
dwellings by the revolt of the people against the agitation of inter-
national Jewry against National Socialist Germany on November 
8, 9 and 10, must be remedied immediately by the Jewish owners 
or Jewish business people. 
Section 2. 
 The costs of repairs must be borne by the owners of the Jewish 
business houses and dwellings. 
 Insurance claims of Jews of German nationality will be confis-
cated in favor of the Reich.71 
 In direct response to the assassination of the German diplomat, 
an exorbitant fine was issued to the Jewish community for the ac-
tions of the one student in Paris:72 
 The inimical attitude of the Jews towards the German people 
and Reich, which does not even hesitate to commit dastardly mur-
ders, calls for a defensive and severe expiation. 
 . . . .  
Section 1. 
 Payment of a contribution of one billion marks to the German 
Reich is imposed upon the Jews of German nationality in their en-
tirety. 73 
As a final blow, the Nazi government issued a third decree banning 
the Jews from all aspects of economic life: 
Section 1. 
 As from January 1, 1939, Jews [as defined in Section 5 of The 
Reich Citizenship Law Regulation of November 14, 1935] . . . will 
be prohibited from operating retail stores, distributing and mail 
order houses or delivery offices, and from carrying on a trade inde-
pendently. 
                                                                                                                      
 70. See GLOVER, supra note 7, at 341-42 (describing the “cold joke” as a Nazi tool of 
dehumanization, invoking contemptuous laughter through the creation of absurd situa-
tions surrounding desecration and execution; for example, creating an Auschwitz prisoner 
orchestra and forcing them to play the Tango while people were shot and graves were dug).  
 71. Decree for the Restoration of the Appearance of the Streets in the Case of Jewish 
Business Enterprises, v. 12.11.1938 (RGB1. I S.189), reprinted in 1 THE HOLOCAUST, supra 
note 59, at 161 (presenting translation by Prentiss Gilbert (Nov. 17, 1938)). 
 72. Cf. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons, adopted 
Aug. 12, 1949, pt. 3, art. 33, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 3538 (“No protected person may be punished for 
an offense he or she has not personally committed.”); see also Daoud Kuttab, Collective 
Punishment, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW, supra note 25, at 89 
(describing the present illegality of collective punishment).  
 73. Decree Covering Payment of a Fine by Jews of German Nationality, v. 12.11.1938 
(RGB1. I S.189), reprinted in 1 THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 59, at 158 (presenting transla-
tion by Prentiss Gilbert (Nov. 17, 1938)) (emphasis added). 
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 Furthermore, . . . they are prohibited from offering goods or in-
dustrial services at markets of any kind, fairs or exhibitions, from 
advertising them or from accepting orders for them.74 
E.   Laying the Foundation for the Final Solution 
 The stage had been set: rather than begin by exterminating the 
Jews, the Nazis slowly dehumanized and separated them from Ger-
man society using their legal system. Total legal isolation throughout 
the Reich75 led to relocation to ghettos, and it was an easy transition 
when the time came for implementation of the Final Solution. In re-
moving any hope of citizenship and, thus, state legal protection, the 
ability to participate in the political system, the chance of economic 
livelihood outside the Jewish community, and the opportunity to cre-
ate humanizing bonds with Germans, the laws drew the line that 
would eventually determine who would be sent to the death camps.76  
IV.   BROTHER NUMBER ONE: POL POT’S DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA 
 Khmer Rouge ideology was shaped in the spirit of Stalin77 and 
Mao:78 experimenting with the total redesign of society in search of 
an enlightened state, regardless of consequence. Tragically, the con-
sequences materialized as the annihilation of the Cambodian people, 
which climaxed as the regime grew obsessed with purification 
(means) and lost sight of the enlightened state (end). The Khmer 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Decree to Eliminate the Jews from German Economic Life, v. 12.11.1938 (RGB1. I 
S.189), reprinted in 1 THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 59, at 159 (presenting translation by 
Prentiss Gilbert (Nov. 17, 1938)). 
 75. The Nazis imposed genocide legislation upon the legal systems of its occupied ter-
ritories. LEMKIN, supra note 14, at 138-39, 143 (Czechoslovakia); 399-402 (France); 188-89 
(Greece); 196-97, 440-43 (Luxemburg); 213, 504-05 (Norway); 222-23, 552-55 (Poland); 236-
37 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics); 243-45, 249-50, 259-64, 625-27 (Yugoslavia).  
 76. See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 39, at 89.  
 77. See e.g., SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 1, at 69-70.  At the end of a Party conference 
in Moscow Province, a tribute to Stalin was called for. Everyone stood and clapped wildly, 
for three minutes, then four, then five. The clapping became more painful. It was a kind of 
physical embodiment of the trap people were in. Who would dare to be the first to stop? 
The Secretary did not dare, as his predecessor had been arrested, and the NKVD men were 
there watching. The painful applause went on past ten minutes, with everyone trapped in 
it. Among those on the platform was the director of a paper factory. After eleven minutes of 
applause, he sat down, followed by everyone else. That night, he was arrested. He was 
given ten years on some pretext, but his interrogator told him never to be the first to stop 
applauding. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., GLOVER, supra note 7, at 287:  
  Mao did not want to hear reports of famine, which he thought were being 
spread by rich peasants who did not want to hand over grain. His response was a 
drive against “grain concealment,” which resulted in purges and many suicides. 
Some who denied there was any grain were beaten or tortured. Some were left 
naked to freeze to death in the snow. Some were buried alive. The 1959 harvest 
was at least 30 million tonnes less than the previous year’s, but officials found it 
prudent to report large increases. 
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Rouge sought purity through the eradication of impure Western 
ideas, which led to the elimination of people through calculated vio-
lence rather than law. The spectacle of the project’s size, the rigidity 
and fervor of the coercive revolutionaries, and the sheer inhumanity 
of the belief in re-education or execution rather than systemic evolu-
tion were traits the Khmer Rouge shared with the regimes of Stalin 
and Mao. Indeed, the movement was doomed to repeat its predeces-
sors’ mistakes.79  
 Despite the declared intent of liberating the people of Cambodia 
from a dictator and the grip of oppressive imperialism, the Paris-
educated intellectuals leading the Khmer Rouge had a different 
agenda: “The good of the people was not the goal . . . its aim was to 
prove a theory that had been worked out in the abstract without the 
slightest regard for human factors.”80 The starting point was to be 
the return of the Cambodian people to the fields that gave birth to 
their culture and to put them to work growing rice. 
A.   Rise: In the Name of Liberation 
 The Khmer Rouge overthrew the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government 
on April 17, 1975, taking the capital city of Phnom Penh and forcing 
the immediate evacuation of its two million inhabitants.81 Residents 
of all cities and towns across the nation were to follow suit, leaving 
behind their homes and belongings to take to the roads leading out to 
the fields on foot. No one was spared—even hospitals were emptied, 
giving rise to surreal scenes:  
Thousands of the sick and wounded were abandoning the city. The 
strongest dragged pitifully along, others were carried by friends, 
and some were lying on beds pushed by their families with their 
plasma and IV bumping alongside. I shall never forget one cripple 
who had neither hands nor feet, writhing along the ground like a 
severed worm, or a weeping father carrying his ten-year-old 
daughter wrapped in a sheet tied around his neck like a sling, or 
the man with his foot dangling at the end of a leg to which it was 
attached by nothing but the skin.82 
 For some, the forced relocation took weeks. Many died of disease 
and exposure, and the Khmer Rouge executed anyone suspected of 
having ties to the old regime; piles of dead Lon Nol soldiers symboli-
cally lined the roads.83 Soldiers forced children to watch their par-
ents’ execution and threatened them with a similar fate if they cried 
                                                                                                                      
 79. Id. at 311. 
 80. FRANÇOIS PONCHAUD, CAMBODIA YEAR ZERO 22 (Nancy Amphoux trans., 1978) 
(1977). 
 81. Id. at 3-22. 
 82. Id. at 6-7. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 48 (presenting a refugee’s first-hand account). 
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too loud for “the enemy.”84 Radio programs spewed forth propaganda: 
“[T]he worksites resounded with the joyful cries of the peasants going 
to work.”85  
 The Khmer Rouge sought a new beginning to Cambodia, declaring 
it Democratic Kampuchea and turning the clock back to year zero.86 
The rebirth of the nation into a pure society was to be achieved 
through the elimination of all remnants of the oppressor classes and 
the prevention of further influence, leading to the closing of all bor-
ders and the ceasing of communication with the outside world.87 In-
dividualism was thought to leave one open to Western influence and 
thus cities, private ownership of property, money and markets were 
to be purged.88 The Khmer Rouge extended the cleansing to all areas, 
banning musical instruments, furniture, religion, and the family unit 
(forcing communal living and eating, and teaching children to spy on 
their parents).89 Pursuant to Mao’s “blank slate” theory (focusing on 
the uneducated, as the educated’s slate has already been written 
upon), education implied infection with Western ideals and threat-
ened purity.90 Thus, those who could speak a foreign language and 
even those wearing glasses, as that implied the ability to read, were 
executed.91 The concept of voluntarism led to the belief that any work 
project could be completed provided enough workers indoctrinated 
with proper revolutionary consciousness were involved, regardless of 
lack of skill or technology.92  
B.   Year Zero 
 Despite the terrifying efficiency with which the birth of the revo-
lution was carried out, the movement’s leaders—the “Center”—and 
their methods of rule were shrouded in mystery. Pol Pot did not dis-
close his identity or acknowledge the existence of the new govern-
ment for two years after the victory, rather choosing to hide behind 
the exiled Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the head of the monarchy over-
thrown by the Lon Nol regime. Very few documents exist other than 
                                                                                                                      
 84. See GLOVER, supra note 7, at 300. 
 85. Id. 
 86. PONCHAUD, supra note 80, at 192:  
  On April 17, 1975, a society collapsed; another is now being born from the 
fierce drive of a revolution which is incontestably the most radical ever to take 
place in so short a time. . . .  
 . . . Using class inequality and racial animosity as tools, a handful of ideolo-
gists have driven an army of peasants to bury their entire past.  
 87. See Sydney Schanberg, Cambodia, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD 
KNOW, supra note 25, at 58. 
 88. GLOVER, supra note 7, at 303-04. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Schanberg, supra note 87, at 59. 
 91. See id. 
 92. GLOVER, supra note 7, at 304. 
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the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, the others being mostly 
transcripts of meetings and internal documents. Starting with inter-
nal spoken guidelines and an oppressive constitution, the reclusive 
Center made it so their people lived in a state of flux, fearing the 
whims of the oppressive “liberators.” 
1.   Pol Pot’s Eight Points 
 Although Pol Pot kept his identity and the regime hidden from his 
citizens and the outside world, he was busy establishing the revolu-
tionary framework. Technically meeting as Sihanouk’s government, 
the Center’s first major attempt to distribute a political plan took 
place during a national congress (May 20-24, 1975) attended by rep-
resentatives from all sections of the regime.93 No written documents 
have survived, but firsthand accounts have provided a list of guide-
lines Pol Pot presented in a speech: 
1. Evacuate people from all towns. 
2. Abolish all markets. 
3. Abolish Lon Nol regime currency and withhold the revolutionary 
currency that had been printed. 
4. Defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice. 
5. Execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning with the top 
leaders.  
6. Establish high-level cooperatives throughout the country, with 
communal eating. 
7. Expel the entire Vietnamese minority population. 
8. Dispatch troops to the borders, particularly the Vietnamese bor-
der.94  
This list summarizes the methods employed to further the Center’s 
basic ideas: destruction of the previous regime (execution of the Lon 
Nol leadership), elimination of private property and individualism 
(town evacuation, market and currency abolishment, cooperative es-
tablishment), removal of potential enemies (expulsion of the Viet-
namese minority population, defrocking Buddhist monks), and re-
gime preservation (placement of troops along the Vietnamese bor-
der). 
2.   The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea 
 By the time Sihanouk returned to Cambodia, the Center had met 
twice more under the guise of his leadership and adopted the Consti-
tution of Democratic Kampuchea, which codified what had been vio-
                                                                                                                      
 93. BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA 
UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79, at 55 (1996) [hereinafter THE POL POT REGIME].  
 94. Id. Other accounts have added the order to close schools and hospitals. Id. at 56. 
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lently enforced since the revolutionary victory.95  
 The preamble of the constitution starts out innocently enough: 
“Whereas the entire Kampuchean people . . . desire . . . [a] Kampu-
chea enjoying . . . a national society informed by genuine happiness, 
equality, justice, and democracy, without . . . exploiters or exploited, 
. . . . The Constitution of Kampuchea stipulates as follows[.]”96 How-
ever, the chapters of the constitution resemble tools of coercion 
rather than guarantees of freedom, as all rights are based on na-
tional health, and many significant measures are left broad or unde-
fined. 
 The constitution established the “culture” of the new nation: 
CHAPTER THREE 
Culture 
Article 3 
 The culture of Democratic Kampuchea is of a national, popular, 
forward-looking, and healthful character such as will serve the 
tasks of defending and building Kampuchea into an ever more 
prosperous country. 
 This new culture is absolutely opposed to the corrupt, reactionary 
culture of the different oppressive classes of colonialism and impe-
rialism in Kampuchea.97 
 This is particularly odd, as cultures generally bear constitutions 
rather than vice versa. The intent of the drafters is apparent, consid-
ering the emphasis on the advancement of Democratic Kampuchea 
and the stated “cultural” opposition to imperialism.  
 The framework for the administration of justice was given simple 
treatment, and violations of law were broadly defined as acts threat-
ening the government: 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Justice 
Article 9 
 Justice is administered by people’s courts, which represent and 
defend the people’s justice, defend the democratic rights of the 
people, and punish any act directed against the people’s State or 
violating the laws of the people’s State. 
 . . . . 
Article 10 
 Actions violating the laws of the people’s State are as follows: 
 Hostile and destructive activities that threaten the popular State 
shall be subject to the severest form of punishment. 
                                                                                                                      
 95. ELIZABETH BECKER, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER: THE VOICES OF CAMBODIA’S 
REVOLUTION AND ITS PEOPLE 218 (1986).  
 96. DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA CONST. pmbl. (1976), reprinted in PONCHAUD, supra 
note 80, at 199. 
 97. Id. at 200-01 (emphasis added). 
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 Other cases shall be handled by means of constructive reeduca-
tion in the framework of the State or people’s organizations.98 
Codified ambiguity in defining crime and punishment served a dual 
purpose for the Khmer Rouge: they could both arrest and execute at 
will those considered political enemies.  
 As for civil liberties, the only specific right guaranteed to the peo-
ple was the right to work: 
CHAPTER NINE 
The Rights and Duties of the Individual 
Article 12 
 Every citizen of Kampuchea is fully entitled to a constantly im-
proving material, spiritual, and cultural life. Every citizen of Kam-
puchea is guaranteed a living. 
 All workers are the masters of their factories. 
 All peasants are the masters of the rice paddies and fields. 
 All other working people have the right to work. 
 There is absolutely no unemployment in Democratic Kampuchea. 
Article 13 
 There must be complete equality among all Kampuchean people 
in an equal, just, democratic, harmonious, and happy society 
within the great national union for defending and building the 
country. 
 . . . . 
Article 14 
 It is the duty of all to defend and build the country together in ac-
cordance with individual ability and potential.99 
Despite making all workers masters of their respective work areas, 
the constitution is silent as to the master of the people: in reality, the 
Center. Other rights, implicit in the complete equality requirement, 
rely on the health and progress of the state. In addition to the grant-
ing of “rights,” the constitution makes it the explicit duty of each citi-
zen to further the goals of the state.  
 An apparent grant of religious freedom essentially negates itself: 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
Worship and Religion 
Article 20 
 Every citizen of Kampuchea has the right to worship according 
to any religion and the right not to worship according to any relig-
ion. 
 All reactionary religions that are detrimental to Democratic 
Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people are strictly forbidden.100 
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Again, the focus on national health and ambiguity in “reactionary re-
ligions” seems to erode citizens’ rights rather than add to them.  
 Assembly elections were held pursuant to other chapters of the 
constitution, and the newly-formed assembly accepted Sihanouk’s 
resignation.101 The power vacuum enabled Pol Pot’s government to of-
ficially take power, although it had actually been in control since the 
seizing of Phnom Penh.102  
 While citizens seeking to create a guarantee of rights greater than 
their governors normally adopt constitutions, the Constitution of 
Democratic Kampuchea was the Center’s first and only attempt to 
codify its oppressive ideology. As it was never used to any effect, it 
thus appears to merely symbolize the revolution rather than form an 
effective guarantee of citizens’ rights or a serious tool of coercion. 
Whereas the Nazis built a legal framework in degrees to use against 
the Jews, the Khmer Rouge leadership’s use of law ended103 with this 
nominal document. 
C.   Fumbling Towards Utopia 
 A sense of uninformed optimism pervades the Center’s main 
documents. What follows is a synopsis of three of the few surviving 
records—transcripts of a meeting, one of Pol Pot’s speeches, and the 
Four-Year Plan.  
1.   Minutes from a Center Meeting 
 Shortly before Sihanouk’s resignation, the Center met privately to 
discuss plans to form the official revolutionary government. A tran-
script of the meeting (March 30, 1976) is all that remains. While the 
constitution refers to undefined punishments for crimes against the 
state, the opening section of the transcript clarifies that political 
murder would be an integral part of the system of dealing with oppo-
nents: “The Authority to Smash (People) Inside and Outside the 
Ranks. . . . Let there be a framework of procedures for implementing 
our revolutionary authority.”104 Although the language is obscure, the 
intent is clear: “smash” is the term the Center was known to use in 
place of “kill.”105 The remainder of the document consists of plans to 
                                                                                                                      
 101. BECKER, supra note 95, at 220.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Or perhaps it never began—the constitution was seemingly forged out of habitual 
obligation rather than practical necessity, and it would be hard to believe the Center would 
intend to create a document that would limit their powers. 
 104. “Decisions of the Central Committee on a Variety of Questions” (Mar. 30, 1976), in 
POL POT PLANS THE FUTURE: CONFIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP DOCUMENTS FROM DEMOCRATIC 
KAMPUCHEA, 1976-1977, at 3 (David P. Chandler et al. eds., Ben Kiernan & Chanthou 
Boua trans., 1988) [hereinafter POL POT PLANS THE FUTURE].  
 105. See id. at 1.  
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remove Sihanouk, rice production strategy, and discussion as to 
which Center members would hold office (with Pol Pot as Prime Min-
ister).106  
2.   Excerpts from Pol Pot’s Speech to a Zone Assembly 
 Pol Pot’s remarks in an assembly meeting (June 3-7, 1976) fore-
shadow the dire situation ahead, resulting from impossible demands 
made by an oppressive leader who does not understand the task at 
hand. The theory is “rapid agricultural development without mecha-
nization”107—not only does Pol Pot demand a major increase in pro-
duction, he requires the elimination of means developed to increase 
production. He sets the mark at three tons of rice per hectare, a dra-
matic increase from previous average yields of one ton per hectare, 
likely sustained by the desire to effect change overnight.108 Further, 
Pol Pot estimated that production should increase to ten or eleven 
tons per hectare by 1980—an absurd figure.109  
 The practical difficulty of the Center’s placement of party ideology 
above all else is clear, as solutions to basic agricultural problems are 
explained as solvable by political means: 
The problem of feed for oxen and buffaloes. Can we resolve the 
problem of insufficient pasture or not? We have said that in some 
places buffaloes and oxen are skinny. At first glance it seems as if 
the socialist system is inferior to the private (one). But really this 
problem is only temporary. It is an infantile disease of socialism. 
This is a secondary contradiction, incapable of blocking our offen-
sives. 
 Our system is already socialist, but its philosophy and con-
sciousness are not yet clear. So we continue to provide education in 
politics and consciousness, and draw experiences. We can certainly 
resolve the problem, and concretely, we have every possibility.110 
Instead of introducing a plan for increasing pastureland, for exam-
ple, Pol Pot sees party education as the answer. Despite Pol Pot’s fer-
vor in implementing the revolution, his lack of understanding of ag-
riculture is evident as he discusses obvious facts as if they were revo-
lutionary ideas: “Grass is not a primary resource imported from over-
seas. It is to be found in our country. . . . So if we have a socialist 
revolutionary consciousness, we can fully prepare to organize and 
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implement assignments according to the new situation.”111 Further, 
some of his statements of national pride make no sense whatsoever: 
“Compared to other countries, we have very many more qualities. 
First, they have no hay. Second, they have no grass.”112 
 Finally, Pol Pot describes the zone in which the Center resides as 
the poorest, having few natural resources.113 Rather than setting this 
as a reason for compensation from other zones, he considers this 
shortage the rationale for demanding high performance—recall his 
belief that agricultural progress springs forth from political align-
ment rather than soil quality, for example.114  
 No reference is made to the existing situation or any starting 
point; these figures and explanations reveal themselves to be intel-
lectual dreams rather than plausible agricultural reality. Tragedy 
clearly lies ahead, for impossible goals enforced by torture and execu-
tion can lead to the destruction of an entire population—“We do not 
blame the objective conditions,”115 but only the people that rely on 
them to accomplish our demands. 
3.   The Four-Year Plan 
 The Four-Year Plan (July-August, 1976) was to provide the prac-
tical framework for achieving Center goals, including the ever-
present three tons per hectare target, yet is full of weak assumptions. 
True to Center form, the Plan was never published, nor was most of 
it (mostly the parts dealing with citizen welfare) put into action.116  
  Irrigation was a major problem and the Center planned to solve 
eighty to ninety percent of it by 1980;117 no specific guidelines on how 
to accomplish this feat other than the obvious (forced labor of politi-
cally-aligned citizens) were provided. The malaria problem was to be 
reduced seventy to one-hundred percent by 1980, but the Plan pro-
vided no direction other than the provision of “an organisation to as-
sign and accept responsibility . . . [and] to produce equipment and 
carefully supply necessary medicine.”118  
 The Center’s detachment from the people is evident in the Plan’s 
section on raising the people’s standard of living, in which they list 
material needs in a haphazard fashion: from “water pitchers,” to 
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“medicine,” to “shovels,” to “lamps,” ending with “etc.”119 The Plan 
promises special rest homes for the elderly,120 but conjures the image 
of Boxer’s fate.121 Education is treated briefly and focuses heavily on 
practical training.122 The new culture is based on propaganda and is 
discussed in a characteristically absurd fashion: “Art: Step-by-step (a 
little is enough) in order not to disturb the productive forces raising 
production.”123 
D.   Implosion 
 Extreme production demands coupled with the belief in a tie be-
tween production and political alignment rather than technology or 
skill set the stage for disaster—when quotas were not met, political 
enemies were blamed and a nationwide purge was conducted. As the 
obsession with enemies grew, camps were set up to manage the mass 
torture and execution of enemies.124 The most notorious torture camp, 
Tuol Sleng, was set up on the grounds of a former school in a horribly 
surreal turn of events.125 Men, women, and children were sent there 
almost at random to be tortured into “confessing” their insubordina-
tion, after which they were executed.126 The paranoia knew no 
boundaries, as the purge extended to even the high ranks of the Cen-
ter—Minister of Information Hu Nim, one of the original Khmer 
Rouge leaders, was arrested on suspicion of subversion, tortured into 
writting a “confession” detailing his service to the CIA, and exe-
cuted.127 
 The Khmer Rouge consequentialist ideology proposed the trans-
formation of society at any cost. Impossible demands based on illogi-
cal grounds, yet enforced with unthinkable cruelty, led to two million 
deaths out of a population of less than eight million; sixteen thou-
sand people were tortured and executed in Tuol Sleng alone during 
the “enemy” purges.128 Although the Khmer Rouge started with a 
constitution, their ultimate plans were set out in secret documents, 
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and enforcement was conducted through blind, violent force rather 
than rule of law. 
V.   EXTRACTING LIGHT FROM DARKNESS 
 The Nazis used a legal system to commit genocide; the Khmer 
Rouge did not. While the Nazis conducted their assault on the Jews 
through laws such as the oppressive preliminary orders, the Nurem-
berg Laws, and the Kristallnacht decrees, the Khmer Rouge elimi-
nated their political enemies as a consequence of their social experi-
ment without using formal laws. Having established this difference 
through discussion of the methods used by the two regimes, analysis 
now turns to why this difference exists: disparity in ideology and di-
versity of enemy.  
 While fascist Nazi ideology embraced bureaucracy and law, the 
revolutionary Khmer Rouge leaders were ill suited for civil service 
and thus ruled by sheer force and terror. The Nazis targeted physi-
cally discernible, explicit enemies and were thus able to design spe-
cific laws targeting them; the Khmer Rouge sought implicit enemies 
elusively delineated by state of mind and chose random arrests and 
torture room confessions over any attempt at statutory definition 
(the difficulty of defining such an enemy would likely result in too 
narrow a term). 
A.   Disparity in Ideology 
 Whereas bureaucracy played a major role in the lives of the civil 
servants of the fascist Nazi regime, the Khmer Rouge revolutionaries 
had no government experience and had difficulty establishing a bu-
reaucracy of their own. The notion of law was second nature to the 
Nazis; the Khmer Rouge had little patience for it and stuck to their 
rifles. 
1.   Institution—Nazis 
 Politics bore the Nazi regime; a pre-packaged institution, provid-
ing the implementing framework for centralized power as a tenet of 
fascism. Although Hitler initially altered the system to grant himself 
dictatorial authority, it remained intact. The Nazis were skilled civil 
servants, embracing bureaucracy and eager to take up their respec-
tive roles in the new government as noble cogs in the Third Reich 
machine. The level of involvement required to later conduct the Final 
Solution, due to its sheer magnitude, sheds light on the “pro-
grammed” bureaucrat mentality innate in members of the Nazi 
party: “At issue in assessing the notion of the banality of evil is an 
understanding of not only those who did the actual killing but also 
the great army of ‘desk murderers’ . . . who took charge of transporta-
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tion, scheduling, construction, and disposal of the Jews’ property.”129 
The use of a legal system to pursue the regime’s goals was natural, 
especially considering the basic Nazi policy of legitimizing the perse-
cution of the Jews through science and other social institutions as 
well as the belief in law as the ghost in the bureaucratic machine. 
2.   Revolution—Khmer Rouge 
 Violence bore the Khmer Rouge regime and was to define its rule. 
The use of violent struggle to overcome an existing administration is 
one thing, but it is indeed an entirely different state of affairs for the 
guerillas to lay down their arms and set up a functioning govern-
ment. The problem of institutionalizing a revolution is complicated, 
considering the terms are almost mutually exclusive:  
 Revolutionary movements are poorly suited to becoming func-
tioning regimes—the process is painful and contradictory. Revolu-
tionary movements, after all, focus on seizing nations rather than 
administering them; they are geared toward war. Revolutionaries, 
for the most part, lack bureaucratic skills and are contemptuous of 
“government.” 130 
 Having known success only through violence, the Center believed 
that revolutionary vehemence was a sufficient credential for govern-
ing despite a lack of any civil service experience131—thus, the leaders 
were poorly suited to the workings of government.132 Although they 
initially adopted a constitution, records of official rule consist mostly 
of transcripts of secret meetings. There was no law other than rifle-
toting Khmer Rouge loyalists shouting orders, perhaps because it 
was too much trouble to build a legal system when the policy of vio-
lence that led to revolutionary success could just as easily be applied 
to force the citizenry into compliance: 
 The Khmer Rouge were living proof that power does not grow 
out of a gun. The rifles of the Khmer Rouge destroyed the old 
power, but those same guns could not in the end create a new 
power base. That requires a degree of popular support and under-
standing of the new order that the Khmer Rouge never cultivated 
or won. They ruled, instead, through violence and terror.133 
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B.   Diversity of Enemy 
 Emphasis on purity of race made the removal of Jews from Ger-
man society a founding principle of the Nazi party; forced labor and 
relocation pursuant to the Khmer Rouge consequentialist emphasis 
on purity of society caused the deaths of many Cambodians and led 
to the purge of political enemies as the grand plans failed. Whereas 
the Nazis were able to single out their enemies based on discernible 
physical characteristics and lineage documents, the Khmer Rouge’s 
enemies were such based on belief and thus could be anyone.  
1.   Picking Out the Rotten Fruit—Nazis 
 The Nazis targeted an explicit enemy; the Jews were attacked 
based on their blood and physical characteristics, and as they were 
thus distinguishable from Germans, they made for an easy target. 
The Nazi persecution of the Jews was a process similar to picking 
rotten fruit out of the basket and leaving the good fruit in place. Law 
was the most efficient way to draw the line between Jews and Ger-
mans and was possible because the enemy was obvious.  
2.   Overturning the Basket—Khmer Rouge 
  The Khmer Rouge targeted an implicit enemy; political enemies 
were attacked based on their anti-revolutionary beliefs. The purge 
was similar to overturning the fruit basket134—there was a presump-
tion of guilt and apparently no good fruit. The Center did not codify 
their central tenet of “smashing” political enemies. Had they tried, it 
likely would have been too difficult to specify the requisite mindset 
defining the implicit enemies they sought (any definition would likely 
have been far too narrow). Ultimately, it was far more efficient to 
simply arrest, torture to produce confessions of unspecified crimes, 
and execute.135 
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 To the Nazis, one was Jewish or not based on physical appearance 
or bloodlines; to the Khmer Rouge, one could not be as easily dis-
missed as a non-enemy as one’s state of mind cannot be measured as 
easily as a skull.136 The methods of determining political enemies re-
sembled witch-hunts—arresting men, women, and children, and tor-
turing them until they confessed. Whereas it is believable that seek-
ers of an explicit enemy have a defined purpose and would stop after 
the enemy has been vanquished, seekers of an implicit enemy may 
never stop killing so long as victims keep confessing under torture.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The Nazis used a legal system to commit genocide because their 
institutional embrace of bureaucracy made them dependent on law to 
accomplish their goals, and their enemies were explicit and thus eas-
ily definable under law. In building a wall of legal disenfranchise-
ment around the Jews that effectively removed any hope of state pro-
tection, political representation, economic livelihood, or creation of 
personal bonds with Germans, the line that would eventually deter-
mine who would be sent to the death camps was drawn.  
 The Khmer Rouge did not use a legal system to commit genocide 
because their revolutionary ideology was not conducive to formal 
government or lawmaking, and their enemies were implicit and not 
easily definable under law. Their policy of violence extended from 
overthrowing the Lon Nol regime to forcing citizens to comply with 
the Center’s grand scheme, and their consequentialist ideology 
broadened from killing people through forced work and relocation to 
the torture and execution of political enemies.  
 A final thought: Perhaps more striking than the difference in ends 
(purity of race vs. purity of society) and means (reinventing mankind 
through law versus reinventing civilization through sheer terror) of 
the two regimes is the similarity of the horror they caused. Both fas-
cists coming to power through recognized political channels employ-
ing legal means, and communists seizing power through revolution 
employing extra-legal means turned innocents into enemies and bru-
tally murdered millions of people. The lesson is simple: evil wears 
many masks, but its roots remain constant and shall continue to bear 
sour fruit. Fighting genocide requires looking past the limiting con-
ventional standards of recognition and towards the reality that hu-
manity’s greatest evil can emerge from almost any circumstances—
looking past the finger and towards the direction in which it points. 
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